This reference document is submitted for information under item 5 “Transport Security and Terrorism” of the draft agenda of the Bucharest session of the Council of Ministers.
1. INTRODUCTION

The terrorist attacks of September 2001 in New York and Washington modified probably forever the way security is approached in the transport sector. The use of transport vehicles as actual weapons of destruction targeting both passengers in the vehicles and individuals located in the target buildings exposed a whole new degree of vulnerability within the transport system. As a result of the previously inconceivable magnitude of physical destruction and loss of life, transport authorities and service providers on all levels and in all sectors are having to adjust traditional security assessment procedures and tools to manage and effectively respond to this new level of risk.

Well before these terrorist strikes on the United States, transport infrastructure and equipment has been the target of terrorist action for a number of reasons, among them, it is:

- relatively accessible;
- can attract significant public attention and media coverage;
- is often linked with national symbols such as national airlines;
- can affect large numbers of people in a single strike.¹

Although the 11 September terrorists made use of large commercial airliners to perpetrate the attacks, the aviation industry — most directly impacted by the attacks — is by no means the only transport sector that has found itself reeling in the turbulent wake of the events. All sectors — maritime, rail, public transit, road — had to react immediately to reinforce security measures in the aftermath of the attacks, while at the same time re-examining for the medium and long terms how the attacks had changed the context in which passenger and freight security are assured.

In seeking to come to grips with these and other questions, transport entities have been meeting on local, regional and national levels of government and within some sectors on a multilateral basis to take stock of security considerations relative to counter-terrorism, share best practice, and evaluate necessary technical, legal and legislative adjustments to ensure maximum protection based on evaluated risk against terrorist activity in transport. In January 2002, a number of Transport Ministers gathered in Tokyo, Japan and adopted a joint statement engaging their support for actions and initiatives within the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) on counter-terrorism in air and sea transport². The European Union is in the process of adopting legislation based on the aviation security measures of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC). The G8 countries are examining a variety of issues related to terrorism and security in the transport sector. And the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) in its Inland Transport Committee has begun a discussion on how it can contribute to improving transport security.

It is in this context of exploration and exchange on security issues that several ECMT countries have asked ECMT to examine the issue of terrorism in transport. This scoping paper attempts to examine some of these issues in a preliminary way. The report will take an intermodal approach, describing activities in different sectors of transport. Chapter 2 highlights some of the main impacts discerned to date and initiatives underway and planned in different modes on international and national levels since September 11. Chapter 3 assesses some of the key issues and problems related to terrorism within the transport sector since the attacks. And Chapter 4 focuses on the role of transport Ministries and Ministers in the fight against transport terrorism. As a possible output of a Ministerial discussion on this topic, a draft

¹. U.S. DOT/BTS, 2001
². Transport Ministers’ Statement on Counter-terrorism
Ministerial Declaration on Combating Terrorism in Transport is found in annex to the Summary note of the report CEMT/CM(2002)18.

2. COUNTER-TERRORISM ACTIONS IN TRANSPORT FOLLOWING THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS

2.1 Aviation

Impact of 11 September attacks

The aviation sector was without a doubt the most-directly affected by the 11 September attacks. The shock to the sector came on the heels of an overall decline in the number of “unlawful interferences” (mostly hijackings and sabotage) targeting civil aviation since the 1970s, in spite of a dramatic increase in the number of flights, boardings and passenger-miles flown by scheduled air lines over the period. Indeed, in 2000, attacks targeting civil aviation around the world resulted in only two deaths and 27 injuries.

Following the attacks, the International Air Transport Association has confirmed that year-on-year international scheduled passenger traffic fell in 2001 for the first time in 10 years, nearly 12 percent in December and more than 4 percent for the year as a whole. Similarly, freight traffic dropped nearly 10 percent in December and almost 8 percent over 2001. Total traffic (passenger plus freight) fell by nearly 6 percent, against a total capacity decrease of less than 1 percent. Traffic volumes appeared to be recovering by the end of the year, however.

National responses

In the hours immediately following the attacks, access to airports and aircraft around the world was tightened -- US airports were closed for three days to evaluate security measures and take immediate precautions to increase scrutiny of passengers and baggage. IATA lists the following measures that were taken around the world following the attacks:

- Intensified hand and checked baggage processing;
- Stringent passport/immigration control and improved passenger screening methods;
- Planned federalisation of standards, training and testing for security staff (USA) Restricted gate access at all airports;
- Restriction of carry-on items, in particular, no sharp or knife-like objects, etc.;
- Increased presence of security agents on board aircraft (USA, in particular);
- Improved cockpit security;
- Modification of future aircraft design to take into account evolving safety and security measures.

On the freight side, there was a similar intensification of security precautions, including the use of x-ray machines to screen cargo and verify contents of freight shipments. Further measures included

4. IATA Press Release no. 01, 05 February 2002.
5. OECD, 7 March 2002.
6. IATA: http://www.iata.org/safe_travel.asp
required earlier deadlines for dropping off cargo shipments at airports, bans on shipments from unknown customers, and waiting periods before cargo is loaded onto planes.\footnote{OECD, 7 March 2002.}

\textbf{International responses}

In a significant show of international co-ordination on improved aviation security, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) convened a high-level Ministerial Conference on Aviation Security in Montreal 19-20 February 2002. Ministers and other high-level officials from 154 States and 24 international organisations agreed in Montreal a global strategy for strengthening aviation security world-wide, and issued a public Declaration endorsing the establishment of a comprehensive Aviation Security Plan of Action, to be developed by the ICAO Council and adopted no later than 14 June 2002, with implementation beginning immediately thereafter.

Key elements of the Plan of Action\footnote{ICAO News release, 20 February 2002.} include:

\begin{itemize}
  \item identification, analysis and development of an effective global response to new and emerging threats, integrating timely measures to be taken in specific fields including airports, aircraft and air traffic control systems;
  \item strengthening of the security-related provisions in the Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, using expedited procedures where warranted and subject to overall safety considerations, notably to provide for protection of the flight deck;
  \item close co-ordination and coherence with audit programmes at the regional and sub-regional levels;
  \item processing of the results by ICAO in a way which reconciles confidentiality and transparency;
  \item follow-up programme for assistance, with rectification of identified deficiencies.
\end{itemize}

The European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), comprised of 38 Member states, has had ongoing work on air security against terrorism for nearly three decades. Since the 11 September attacks, ECAC has held a series of task force meetings that have produced recommendations on improved aviation security measures. The European Union, which prior to 11 September had not introduced any air security legislation, has based its forthcoming aviation security legislation on the ECAC aviation security or AVSEC measures.\footnote{Billing, Knut, 18 December 2001.} Awaiting a second reading in the European Parliament at the time of this writing, the legislation is expected to pass in June 2002. In addition, the ECAC’s AVSEC audit programme, the only multilateral aviation security audit programme in the world, may be expanded to include US participation in the audit teams, with the possibility for ECAC to then audit US airports in return.

\subsection{2.2 Maritime}

\textbf{Factors in maritime shipping and terrorism}

The maritime sector is a second transport domain in which a concentration of efforts to enhance the security framework has taken place since September 11. Several vectors of risk to terrorist attack are inherent to maritime shipping: they include\footnote{OECD, 6 March 2002.}:
− *The Ship*: using the ship itself, particularly LPG/LNG carriers as a weapon, to launch an attack or to disrupt infrastructure;

− *People/Cargo*: attacking the ship to provoke human casualties, using cargo to smuggle people or weapons, to transport conventional, nuclear, chemical or biological weapons; using the cover of seafarer identities to insert terrorist operatives;

− *Financing Terrorist Activities*: using revenue from shipping to fund terrorist activities; using ships to launder illicit funds for terrorist organisations.

**International responses**

In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the United Nations International Maritime Organisation (IMO), which has primary responsibility for multilateral agreements on international maritime rules and issues, undertook a reassessment of the state of international maritime security regulations. As a part of this initiative and upon the particular request of the United States, the IMO Maritime Safety Committee’s Intersessional Working Group on Maritime Security met in London 11-15 February 2002, to review measures to strengthen ship security.

At the close of the meeting, a number of recommendations were agreed for submission to the IMO Maritime Safety Committee in May 2002. Among those proposed are included:

− Early implementation for the fitting of *Automatic Identification Systems* for all ships of 500 gross tonnage and above on international trips;
− The mandatory development of *ship security plans* for all ships engaged in international trips;
− The required designation of a *ship security officer*, responsible for crew training, implementation of the ship security plan and co-ordination with port security officers;
− For shipping companies, the requirement to designate a *company security officer* in charge of *inter alia* preparing ship security plans;
− Mandatory preparation of *port security plans* as well as the carrying out of port vulnerability assessments according to specified guidelines;
− The required designation of a *port security officer*, with mandatory security training for port workers.

Following this IMO initiative, the OECD Ad Hoc Working Group on Security of the Maritime Committee met to assess areas of complementary work to be undertaken within the Committee on maritime safety issues. A number of areas of possible work were suggested and will be discussed at the July 2002 meeting of the OECD Maritime Transport Committee. Among them are included:

− work related to the transparency in ownership and control of vessels;
− best practices such as port and ship security plans, possible standards to respond to various risk scenarios, and personnel identification and clearance procedures;
− risk analysis work, including probability assessments, and the economic modelling of the costs and impacts of maritime terrorist attacks;
− security aspects related to the intermodal flow of products throughout the transport chain, including port interfaces. It was suggested that this could be carried out in co-ordination with the ECMT and IMO.12

The European Commission has also proposed a package of measures to improve port security, including mandatory container scanning by the year 2004, security plans for port perimeters, and a published register of all seaports in the European Union, classified according to security status. The criteria for this classification were under deliberation at the time of the writing of this paper.13

National responses

Most national initiatives are being addressed via the IMO ongoing consultation process. While awaiting the outcome of these discussions, a number of countries are taking provisional measures that include:

− increased screening, boarding, and inspection of ships;
− heightened surveillance of port facilities and maritime infrastructure;
− establishment of exclusion zones around sensitive ships such as military vessels or cruise ships;
− increased number and scope of container screening programmes.14

Since the events of September 2001, the US has tightened security measures involving ports and ships to a greater extent than most other countries. The US Government’s Container Security Initiative (CSI) is designed to enhance security of oceangoing sea containers by pre-screening cargo containers at ports of origin or transit rather than waiting for these goods to arrive in US ports for inspection.

The CSI consists of four core elements. These are: (1) establishing security criteria to identify high-risk containers; (2) pre-screening containers before they arrive at US ports; (3) using technology to pre-screen high-risk containers; and (4) developing and using smart and secure containers.

As a first step, the U.S. has determined the top 10 "mega-ports" that send containers to the United States, and will contact the governments in these locations to solicit their participation in the CSI. These locations were identified based on their volume of sea container traffic destined for the US. The CSI will not be restricted to these locations, however and container traffic destined for the US will not be limited to CSI ports. Furthermore, the US Government expects that advance targeting of containers destined for the United States should, under normal circumstances, result in those shipments clearing Customs rapidly since they present no identifiable risk.

2.3 Rail

Key factors in rail and terrorism

Relative to other transport modes, criminal activities targeting railway infrastructure and rolling stock have remained relatively infrequent on a world-wide basis, although several ECMT countries, notably the United Kingdom, have a long-standing security framework to deal with terrorist acts targeting rail. Railroad police forces have been established in many countries with independent authority and cooperation agreements with government law enforcement agencies. On an international level, the rail security association COLPOFER brings together railway police and security services from 19 European countries.

12. OECD, 6 March 2002.
countries to exchange experience and information on railway security and acts as an advisory body to the International Union of Railways (UIC) on security issues.

Rail systems are inherently vulnerable to terrorist acts due to a number of factors, among them:

- Railway stations are by and large easily accessible, open buildings, and rail track infrastructure is very often unprotected, particularly in rural areas;
- Rail tracks and switches are vulnerable to tampering;
- Railroad bridges are vulnerable to explosive attacks, as are tunnels to attacks by explosives and bio-chemical agents;
- Control and dispatching systems are vulnerable to explosive and cyber attacks.

Moreover, terrorists may target trains carrying hazardous or nuclear materials to perpetrate heavy physical damage and loss of human life; disrupt important shipments of sensitive military equipment or commercially important goods.

International responses

Terrorism in the rail sector is not a new preoccupation for the UIC. Its working groups on passenger security along with COLPOFER have examined this problem for many years. The events of September 11 have, however, brought to the forefront several key issues of importance for rail:

- Passenger and freight rail security must be assured without interfering with train operations;
- The open environment of railways and railway stations makes it impossible to adapt many of the restrictive measures implemented in the aviation sector;
- Enhanced information gathering and intelligence-sharing is essential;
- Partnerships between public and private actors in the rail sector, with clear division of responsibilities, is crucial.

Since the September 2001 attacks, the US Federal Rail Administration (FRA) has been actively participating in a number of UIC meetings. US FRA officials joined UIC directors of security and communications for a first meeting in December 2001, during which the importance of effectively communicating with the public – providing information on the situation without creating additional anxiety -- was identified as particularly important. Maintaining public confidence in the rail system while taking measures to demonstrate rail company commitment to address the crisis was seen as a key short-term objective, with additional security and counter-terrorism measures to be proposed in the medium-to-long term.

The UIC will be encouraging exchanges among countries on emergency intervention plans, monitoring systems, and information-sharing, as well as financing research and examining security risks in railway stations.

On the freight side, protection of facilities and cargo is seen as the main preoccupation. A joint task force with the US FRA has been established to examine rail freight security issues. A meeting of the task force is to be held in Japan in May 2002 focusing on risks of attack using chemical substances in particular. And a World Forum on Rail Security will be held in November 2002 in Rome.

National responses

Counter-terrorism measures implemented in the rail sector on a national level include the following:

− Improved co-operation between local law enforcement authorities and private security agencies, with involvement of the military where necessary;
− Reviews of company security procedures in light of the heightened security threat;
− Specific awareness training and emergency procedure drills for railway personnel;
− More rapid introduction of new security technologies.

Since September 11, the United States government has developed five “critical action” teams to undertake risk assessment in the rail sector in terms of i.) disruption to physical assets ii.) information technology and communications iii.) chemical and hazardous materials transport iv.) Defense Department shipments v.) train operations. Particular challenges facing rail in the United States, but no doubt in many other countries as well, include the co-ordination of security options among modes and balancing security with operational safety and economic necessity. 16

Because of its history of terrorist attacks, there is considerable practical experience in rail security in the UK. The National Railway Security Programme concentrates on aspects such as station searches, security of left luggage, and security of non-public areas. The stations are grouped into four Groups according to established risk criteria, and measures applied according to the grouping; for example a Group A station will have much more stringent security requirements than a Group D station. Regarding the Channel Tunnel, “airport style” security has been implemented for passengers at Waterloo and Ashford stations and passenger vehicle security at Cheriton station (Shuttle) using Explosive Trace Detection Equipment and Under Vehicle Video, Heavy Goods Vehicle security using vehicle x-ray, and Trace Detection. 17

The Italian railways have, among others, conducted a risk evaluation of its fixed assets in the rail sector, including stations, tunnels and bridges; updated emergency plans and conducted reviews and training drills in railway stations and offices. Private security services have been engaged to patrol stations, rolling stock yards, and chemical and hazardous material yards. Enhanced security measures in postal services have also been put in place, notably x-ray screening of mail. 18

Japan has implemented specific measures for its Shin-kansen bullet trains that include enhanced video camera surveillance and increased patrols in railway stations, in the trains themselves and in rail yards. 19

17. UK National Contribution, 14 March 2002
2.4 Road

Key considerations in road transport terrorism

The inherent openness of road and highway systems make them particularly vulnerable to terrorist activities, such as:

- Sabotage on roadways of vehicles carrying large numbers of passengers;
- Attacks on or using lorries carrying dangerous goods (explosive substances, hazardous materials, biochemical substances);
- Truck and car bombs in crowded urban areas, in tourist locations, or near sensitive industrial, military or politically significant infrastructure and buildings.

International responses

The International Road Union (IRU), whose members include truck, coach and taxi operators worldwide, has a long-standing programme of work addressing different types of road security issues, including road safety, security for drivers, cargo, passengers and vehicles, and commercial and customs security. On 5-6 February 2002, the IRU held a conference in Moscow on Terrorism and Security in Transport, at which the terrorism dimension was added to the scope of security issues handled by IRU.

The conference Recommendations, which focus on Russia and the CIS, note that smuggling of goods is one of the main sources of financing of terrorist activities, its prevention requiring joint efforts of government and the private sector. The recommendations also call for “comprehensive legal measures” at both national and international levels to “prevent, reveal, suppress and investigate” terrorist acts that threaten transport security both in and outside of Russia.\(^\text{20}\)

In the immediate aftermath of September 11, vehicle, cargo and driver identification checks at border crossing points increased, became more thorough and consequently more lengthy in some countries. Along the US-Canada border, for example, programmes offering pre-approved travel to frequent travellers were suspended. The obvious consequence of this was that congestion increased at many points of departure from and entry to the countries, with longer waiting times to cross at border points.\(^\text{21}\)

Working together since the attacks, the US and Canada have together planned and implemented policies and measures to restore levels of mobility necessary to maintain their trading partnership. By passing legislation to fund and facilitate changes to the system, and by preparing joint declarations to put in place operational changes, these efforts have led in recent months to:

- Funding for significant increases in the number of federal inspection staff;
- Re-instatement of pre-approved travel programmes for frequent cross-border travellers;
- Increased use of information systems and inspection technology;
- Enhanced co-operation with industry to tighten security;
- Integration of intelligence, enforcement and data sharing between the countries.\(^\text{22}\)

\(^{20}\) IRU, 27 February 2002.

\(^{21}\) Rogers, Gordon, January 2002.

\(^{22}\) Ibid.
National responses

In most countries, national and local governments took immediate steps to protect public buildings and sensitive infrastructure, military, industrial and commercial sites in the hours following the September 2001 attacks, notably by erecting barriers around and blocking road access to vulnerable sites, and carrying out vehicle identity and driver checks in and outside of cities.

2.5 Public Transit

Public transit has often been a target of terrorists, particularly because of the potential for a large number of casualties in the context of one attack, and because the nature and urban location of the attacks can draw considerable media attention. The Paris metro attacks of July 1995, for example, were timed to occur at 18:00 in order to make the evening television news headlines.

Much has been learned from terrorist attacks on transit systems in the recent past, including the sarin nerve gas attack in the Tokyo metro in March 1995, the Paris metro bomb of July 1995, and the series of terrorist attacks over the years on public transit in the UK, among many others in different parts of the world. In these countries as in most others as well, tight security plans and provisions are in place to be implemented based on assessed risk in times of threat or attack. As transit systems all differ, there is no standard approach to counter-terrorist measures nor to security in general.

International responses

Perhaps due to the inherently urban, regional and national nature of public transit, there appears to be no significant international/multilateral initiatives taken in this area at this time.

National responses

Since 11 September 2001, the US Federal Transit Administration has implemented a number of specific security measures designed to enhance security provisions in place and assess remaining vulnerabilities in light of the attacks. They include:

- A series of security assessments on the nation’s 30 largest transit systems using threat and vulnerability methodologies. The assessments are being carried out by expert teams made up of former Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation and counter-terrorism experts, among others, in co-ordination with local agencies.
- The provision of assistance and funding to transit agencies to conduct emergency response drills and regional training workshops on security.
- The allocation of USD 2 million in supplementary research and development funding to focus on soon-to-be-deployed technology to enhance security.

The Japanese government has, among others, provided guidance to transit systems to increase surveillance patrols at bus stops near major railway and bus stations, especially when vehicles are parked and during boarding times. It is encouraging more frequent and thorough inspections of all equipment and

facilities before and after operations, and has invited passengers to co-operate with authorities on identifying suspicious individuals.  

2.6 Inland Navigation

Possible factors in inland navigation and terrorism

Given that inland waterways are in many countries a key link in the transport chain for goods travelling through national waters to maritime ports before being loaded onto sea vessels (and vice versa), the factors of risk associated with container tracking and transparency, personnel identification and vessel ownership are similar to those associated with maritime shipping. There is perhaps an added important element of risk in that boats and ships navigating on inland waterways often pass through urban areas, near sensitive infrastructure and industrial sites. The possibility for terrorist attacks using river vessels in any of these areas is potentially preoccupying.

International responses

International bodies that deal with transport on inland waterways have not yet begun a multilateral discussion process to examine terrorism issues, though interviews conducted with two international bodies in Europe suggested that they were tracking developments in other transport sectors with a view to possible future discussions on the topic among their members.

National responses

Inland waterways are considered a priority concern and particularly vulnerable to terrorist action in Russia, given the location of power plants and dams along many of Russia’s rivers. In the wake of the September attacks, armed military personnel were placed at sensitive or strategic sites along these waterways.

3. KEY ISSUES AND PROBLEMS RELATED TO TRANSPORT TERRORISM: STATE OF THE DEBATE SINCE SEPTEMBER 11

Transport sector experience since the events of late 2001 has revealed a number of areas of uncertainty with regard to ensuring security against terrorism attacks in transport. Transport authorities and operators have since September 11 found themselves seeking answers to a number of security-related questions, among them:

- Are existing security measures and procedures sufficient in the current post-September 11 context? Where are the remaining vulnerabilities in the system and how best can they be addressed?
- Is it just a question of better implementation/greater enforcement of existing procedures or are new measures needed?


Are the current evaluation tools, including risk and vulnerability assessment methodologies, sufficient to provide the necessary information to decision-makers given the magnitude and potential impact of the terrorist threat, particularly with perceptions of heightened insecurity in certain areas since the attacks? What are the costs of using these tools, and who should cover these costs? What are acceptable levels of risk?

Similarly, how much security is « enough »? That is to say, where is it necessary to draw the line in tightening security so as to avoid unnecessarily increasing transport costs without adding benefits, and thereby constraining transport activity which is essential to national economic health?

This list of questions is by no means exhaustive, but it perhaps highlights some of the key uncertainties currently facing transport actors in government and industry in all transport sectors in this post-11 September context.

**Need for better co-ordination on security**

...among modes and sectors...

Transport sector experience in the aftermath of 11 September also reveals that most activities to enhance security since that time have been concentrated within individual transport modes. Counter-terrorism in the aviation and maritime sectors -- though actively debated at present in multilateral organisations -- remains focused on those individual modes. Rail security appears to be largely focused on national-level initiatives, with little inter-governmental exchange to date. Terrorism in road transport has received relatively little attention. There appears to be no multilateral discussion underway on potential risks concerning inland waterway terrorism. And whilst there does appear to be significant experience in establishing an intermodal, public transit system-wide approach to counter-terrorist policies and measures, the debate remains logically focused on a local and national level.

If this mode-focused approach to counter-terrorism measures is indeed the case in most countries, then it would seem that there may be further need to ensure that the linkages among air and rail, rail and road, inland waterway and maritime transport are seen in the context of an intermodal transport security framework. Several factors stand out as particularly important. Whilst some counter-terrorism measures are clearly mode-specific -- e.g., barring cockpit access in planes, mandatory installation of automatic identification systems for ships, etc. -- others have implications for several modes, e.g., transparency in tracking of container goods in transit via road, rail or waterways to airports and maritime ports. The involvement of several modes in the latter example demonstrates, it would seem, the need for a co-ordinated security approach: lack of vigilance at any point in the transport chain could render the entire chain vulnerable to terrorist action.

Moreover, security measures imply costs, and fragmented, mode-specific security measures may lead to inefficiencies in resource allocation across the sector. A co-ordinated and level playing field as concerns costs is important notably for industry: piecemeal security requirements in individual sectors that do not take account of initiatives in related modes can result in inconsistent demands being made on transport service providers, operators, etc. Co-operation with the private sector may be especially important in this regard.

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27. The question of costs is perhaps particularly relevant in the context of the rail sector, which is currently undergoing varying levels of privatisation in many countries.
Initiatives for a more multimodal perspective on security are underway in a number of countries. The US, for example, has set up a separate administration within the Department of Transportation to oversee co-ordination among modes on counter-terrorism initiatives. In Russia, a Federal Anti-Terrorist Commission has been created with representatives from concerned Ministries to examine transport-related security and anti-terrorism issues and in the Netherlands, a joint consultation group with the Ministries of Transport, Justice and the Interior has been set up to examine security matters concerning transport.

Co-ordination on transport security and terrorism – be it among modes, private and public sector entities, or countries – necessitates some degree of policy transparency. Whilst caution is running high at present with regard to the sensitivity of information related to terrorism in the transport sector – and understandably so -- it may nevertheless be important that national counter-terrorism experience for modes other than aviation and maritime -- which already benefit from multilateral co-ordination -- be shared to the extent deemed possible by national authorities with other countries in a multilateral setting. In this way, best practice is shared (e.g. information exchange on new security technologies), vulnerabilities within the system are better understood (and thereby can be more effectively addressed) and co-ordination among countries is enhanced. If determined by its members to be of potential use, ECMT could serve as a forum in which this enhanced, intermodal discussion on terrorism and security in the transport sector could be pursued.

4. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF TRANSPORT MINISTRIES AND MINISTERS?

Transport Ministers usually find themselves in the spotlight after violent attacks on transport infrastructure, obligated to rapidly reassure a worried public that emergency security measures are being taken to ensure safe transport. And co-ordination of transport-sector security initiatives falls on their shoulders in times of terrorist or other violent activity. The necessity for Ministries to identify and address vulnerabilities within and across transport modes has become particularly apparent since the events of September 2001.

Based on the information obtained to date, there appears to be a number of areas in which Transport Ministries can perhaps effectively oversee the policy and technical debate surrounding counter-terrorism in transport.

Transport Ministries and Ministers can:

− Ensure a co-ordinated inter-modal framework for security in the transport sector, in co-ordination with other Ministries handling national security and terrorist issues (e.g., the Ministries of Defence and Interior)
− Provide support for risk and vulnerability assessments as well as training for personnel on emergency procedures within and between modes as well as on regional and local levels;
− Share to the extent possible experience and best practice on transport security and counter-terrorism measures with other governments;
  • whilst a multilateral framework exists for aviation and maritime, it is lacking for surface modes.
− Build on already existing initiatives to improve security and reduce crime in transport (e.g., tracking of goods transport) where possible to improve transport efficiency and counter-terrorism measures; and
− Similarly, seek measures that create complementarity among security, safety and counter-terrorism initiatives.
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